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INSURRECTION AT QALA-I JANGI
Dodge Billingsley
B
y mid November 2001 there were only a few 
pockets of Taliban across northern 
Afghanistan. The last major city still in 
Taliban hands was Konduz in the northeast part of 
the country. In typical Afghan style, the surrender of 
Konduz to the Northern Alliance was negotiated 
while Northern Alliance forces tightened the circle 
around the besieged city. Within the ranks of the 
Taliban holding the city were a number of foreign 
fighters, the majority were said to be Pakistani and 
various Arab nationals. However, there were also 
supposed to be Chechens, Uzbeks, Uighurs and 
other foreign nationals within the ranks.
Any surrender of the city would have to take into 
account these foreigners, which was problematic 
since, not being local, they could not simply lay 
down their weapons and return to a life in 
Afghanistan outside war, or jump over to the side of 
the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance’s new 
ally, the U.S., was in Afghanistan hunting al Qaeda 
and was extremely interested in foreigners and any 
possible links to terrorists networks operating 
abroad—these foreigners had to be accounted for. In 
this political climate Taliban leaders negotiated for 
the surrender of the foreigners in their ranks in 
addition to Konduz itself.
It was finally negotiated that one such Taliban 
group, numbering as many as 500, would surrender 
to the warlord of Mazar-e Sharif, ethnic Uzbek 
General Rashid Dostum. Actually, Dostum was 
quite active in the negotiations for Konduz as it 
appears that he wanted to flex his muscle in the 
north and perhaps take part in the “land-grab” that 
was going on amongst Northern Alliance rivals in 
Afghanistan following the retreat or elimination of 
Taliban forces.
Saturday, 23 November
Saturday afternoon the foreign Taliban arrived 
northeast of Mazar-e Sharif. They arrived earlier 
than expected, but this could have been due to the 
fact that they had not traveled to the pre-designated
meeting place, but in fact stopped many miles short. 
There were a few hours of negotiations and then it 
seemed that the matter was resolved. They were told 
to throw their weapons in a truck and were 
considered disarmed. However, there were 
immediate signs of trouble in the desert meeting 
place as one Talib detonated a grenade killing 
himself and two other Taliban, wounding a Northern 
Alliance commander and an ITN reporter covering 
the surrender.
According to Amir Jan, a Taliban defector who 
actually helped negotiate the surrender of the foreign 
troops destined for Qala Jangi, there were a couple 
of critical mistakes made in the surrender process 
leading up to the meeting in the desert. First, he 
claims that the foreigners were to have surrendered 
in Erganak, 12 miles west of Mazar-e Sharif. 
Instead, they traveled to a point northeast of the 
strategic city causing confusion as to whether or not 
this was in fact the group surrendering. It was 
evident that another mistake occurred during the 
surrender negotiations, this time by Mullah Fahzel, 
the overall Taliban commander at Konduz. He 
instructed the foreigners to turn in their weapons but 
did not tell them that they would also be taken into 
custody. It appears that many, if not all, of the 
foreign Taliban believed they would turn in their 
weapons and then go free.
After some confusion, the matter was resolved, 
and, under the watchful eye of U.S. Special Forces, 
General Dostum ordered the prisoners loaded on 
trucks and transported to Qala-i Jangi, a nineteenth- 
century fortress located southwest of Mazar-e Sharif. 
General Dostum did not accompany the prisoners to 
Qala-i Jangi but instead continued on to Konduz to 
participate in the securing of that city from Taliban 
control. (There are many numbers floating around 
as to the size of the foreign Taliban escorted to Qala- 
i Jangi. By some accounts it seems there were no 
more than five trucks, which means that the number 
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Northern Alliance troops loyal to General Rashid Dostum in a mud hut atop the northeast tower on Monday morning, awaiting orders.
assuming 50 to a truck. However, by most accounts 
the number of 500 Taliban stands firm.)
The situation did not get better once the Taliban 
reached the fortress, roughly an hour’s drive from 
their meeting place in the desert. Again a Talib 
produced a grenade from an undisclosed place and 
detonated it, killing himself and killing or wounding 
another Northern Alliance officer, Nadir Ali. 
Sometime later another Talib detonated a grenade 
killing himself and a senior Hazara commander, 
Saeed Asad. By now darkness was upon the fortress 
and Dostum’s guards responded by herding the 
remaining prisoners into an underground cell 
complex beneath the “pink house”—a building in 
the center of the fortress’s southern 
courtyard—where they were left overnight.
Sunday, 24 November
That morning a CIA operative known only as 
Dave and fellow agent Johnny (Mike) Spann arrived 
at Qala-i Jangi to begin interrogating the prisoners. 
They arrived in separate vehicles which they parked 
in the north half of the fortress near an entrance to 
the southern courtyard. The prisoners were led from 
the cell structure into the southern courtyard one by 
one. According to American Taliban John Walker 
his hands were tied as he surfaced from the cells 
below. It is notable that there still had not been a 
thorough search of the Taliban prisoners.
For the CIA and the intelligence effort of the 
war, the prisoners were the first big capture of 
foreigners taken in the seven week war and it was
likely Spann and Dave were anxious to find out who 
was in the group. Dostum’s chief of intelligence, 
Sayid Kamil accompanied the CIA men into the 
southern courtyard and watched as they began 
talking to the prisoners.
At some point during the interrogations, the 
Taliban revolted and killed CIA officer Spann, 
wounded Dostum’s Intelligence Chief and killed a 
number of Northern Alliance guards as they took 
possession of the southern courtyard. The other CIA 
operative, Dave, managed to get out of the southern 
courtyard and run to a main building along the north 
wall. Also inside the main building were the Red 
Cross, who arrived to make sure the prisoners were 
being treated fairly, and at least one TV crew, 
including German ARD TV.
An intense firefight ensued between the Taliban 
inside the southern courtyard and the Northern 
Alliance troops guarding the prisoners. By all 
estimates, it appears that there were only about 100 
Northern Alliance soldiers in the fortress when the 
uprising occurred. During the struggle, Taliban 
insurgents set about freeing their comrades still 
under restraint and found a large cache of weapons 
and ammunition stored along the south side of the 
wall dividing the northern and southern courtyards.
Armed with mortars, RPGs and small arms, they 
took control of the southern courtyard and continued 
a brisk exchange of fire with Northern Alliance 
troops gathering along the north wall and roof of the 
main building. Two Northern Alliance T-55 main 
battle tanks assumed positions along the fortress’s
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north wall and courtyard below, and began firing 
100mm shells into the Taliban-held southern section.
Whether or not it was lost in the melee or just 
left in their vehicles, Dave was missing his 
communications gear when he reached the main 
building and was forced to use the German TV’s 
satellite telephone to call for help. Around two 
o’clock U.S. and British Special Forces personnel 
arrived at the fortress. After conferencing briefly 
with Northern Alliance commanders, and Dave still 
holed up in the main building, they assumed 
positions on the northwest towers and the roof of the 
main building and began orchestrating combat air 
support.
At around 4:00 p.m., the Special Forces teams 
guided the first of several air strikes on the fortress, 
while Dave, wounded Northern Alliance troops, and 
the journalists, climbed over the back wall from their 
position along the inner parapet and exited the 
fortress to the north running to a nearby road. 
Meanwhile the air strikes continued with mixed 
success. A number of the ordnance missed the 
southern courtyard but Northern Alliance soldiers on 
the spot claimed the air strikes were instrumental in 
containing the Taliban to the southern section of the 
fortress. However, in possession of the weapons 
facilities, the Taliban insurrection was far from over. 
In fact, it was just beginning.
Monday, 25 November
By the next morning the battle lines were firmly 
drawn. Taliban fighters still controlled the southern 
courtyard—roughly half of the approximately 500- 
meter-long fortress—while Northern Alliance troops 
had reinforced their positions at the main gate, along 
the northern walls and just outside the southern walls 
of the fortress. A T-55 main battle tank remained on 
the northeast tower from the day before, while a 
second tank continued to hold its position below in 
the courtyard, barrel pointing into an alleyway 
between the southern and northern courtyards.
Taliban fire from the southern courtyard was 
significant, as they had managed to acquire rockets 
and mortar systems in addition to other small arms. 
However, the lower interior wall dividing the 
northern and southern courtyards severely reduced 
the Taliban forces’ field of fire. Much of the firing 
was directed through the alleyway, since attempts to 
fire over the interior wall sent rocket and rifle fire 
arcing over the external north wall and into nearby 
fields.
At around 11:00 a.m. the U.S. and British 
Special Forces again arrived in an attempt to retrieve 
Spann’s body. A group of 11 personnel proceeded to
the main gate and then broke into two positions 
within the fort designated CAS 1 (Close Air 
Support) above the main gate and CAS 2 at the 
northeast tower. A QRF position (Quick Reaction 
Force) was set up on the road 300-400 meters north 
of the fortress.
Twenty minutes later a 2000 lb. Joint Direct 
Attack Munition, or JDAM, GBU-32 struck the 
north wall, only meters from the northeast tower, 
basically on top of CAS 2. All five U.S. personnel 
were wounded, the most serious with a fractured 
pelvis. It is possible that British SAS and SBS 
troops were also wounded in the incident but it is 
unclear as the British government failed to say so. 
The fact is, the trajectory of the bomb as it hit the 
wall caused the wall to lift up underneath CAS 2, 
throwing them in the air but likely saving the entire 
team from death. Two Northern Alliance soldiers 
inside the T-55 tank on the northeast tower were 
instantly killed when their tank was flipped by the 
blast ripping the turret from the hull. Dozens of 
other Afghans scurried off the wall stumbling into 
nearby cotton fields, many of them bloody and 
covered in dust. Most of the Northern Alliance 
soldiers along the north wall left the fortress fearing 
further air strikes.
The errant bomb strike marked the end of any 
Afghan or U.S. military operations during the 
remaining daylight hours on Monday. However, 
there continued to be a steady stream of mortar and 
rocket fire coming from the southern courtyard. At 
dusk Special Forces and other U.S. personnel 
returned to the fortress to talk to Northern Alliance 
commanders and survey the bomb damage. They 
were also there to discuss the next phase of the 
operation.
That night (Monday), two AC-130 gunships 
pounded the southern courtyard with 40mm and 
105mm rounds. At about 2:30am they hit an ammo 
dump, detonating the entire cache of weapons 
forcing them to leave the airspace above the Qala-i 
Jangi.
Tuesday, 26 November
The mood among Northern Alliance soldiers at
the fortress was optimistic Tuesday morning on the 
heels of the AC-130 strikes. Some Afghan soldiers 
suggested there might be a handfull of Taliban still 
alive and in fighting condition but no more than that.
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U.S. troops from the Iff1' Mountain Light Infantry Division at the QRF position prior to Monday's air strike.
Still preparations were being taken for a final assault 
on the southern courtyard. Northern Alliance 
General Majid Rozi gave instructions to his 
commanders for what he said would be the final 
push to retake the southern courtyard and end the 
insurrection. The attack was scheduled to begin at 10 
am but ran a little late as again U.S. and British 
Special Forces personnel arrived, pulling into the 
main gate. They reestablished their position on the 
roof of the main gate. Aircraft could be heard 
overhead and it appeared that they were prepared to 
call in further strikes if for some reason the battle 
escalated out of control or the Northern Alliance lost 
the upper hand.
Northern Alliance soldiers massed inside the 
main gate and along the north side of the interior 
wall. Additional Northern Alliance troops were 
positioned outside the exterior wall, just south of the 
fortress. Once put into effect, the plan called for 
Northern Alliance troops to storm the Taliban-held 
southern courtyard from both the northern courtyard 
and over the southern exterior wall. A T-55 and 
another T-62 main battle tank were brought into the 
fortress through the main gate to support the push 
into the Taliban-controlled area, while Northern 
Alliance troops surrounded the fortress to keep the 
Taliban from escaping over the exterior wall.
The fighting commenced in fits and starts, and 
dead and wounded (including one Taliban wounded 
by shrapnel, whom Northern Alliance soldiers 
characterized as Tajik) were carried out through the 
main gate or over the southern exterior wall, put into 
commandeered taxis and jeeps and driven away, 
presumably to a hospital.
By noon the Northern Alliance had penetrated 
the southern courtyard through the alleyway and 
controlled the western half of the southern courtyard 
all the way to the pink house, as well as the parapets 
above on the southern wall of the fortress. However, 
the east end of the courtyard, protected by woods 
and various buildings, was not easy to clear and the 
Taliban continued to put up stiff resistance. 
Eventually Northern Alliance troops worked ,their 
way down the wall and began clearing the remaining 
courtyard meter by meter.
Progress was frequently interrupted by soldiers 
stopping to loot the dead and scavenge weapons and 
other valuables off the battlefield much to the anger 
of their commanders.
The troops’ hesitancy to move forward was well 
founded as it seemed that just when the battle 
appeared to be over, Taliban emerged from the 
stables or other buildings, opening fire on the
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Northern Alliance soldiers en route to the fortress, which is visible in the background.
advancing Northern Alliance soldiers. This led to 
the retreat of Northern Alliance back to the parapet 
above and the firefight would begin all over again.
Unwilling to risk more close-quarters combat, the 
Northern Alliance moved in the T-62 tank, and fired 
a series of rounds into suspected Taliban positions in 
the eastern part of the courtyard. By dusk Northern 
Alliance forces had overrun the courtyard. The 
insurrection at Qala-i Jangi was all but over. 
Sometime later, the Special Forces retrieved Spann’s 
body from the southern courtyard with the help of 
Northern Alliance personnel.
The Aftermath and Conclusion
General Dostum, who had been in Konduz 
during the entire uprising arrived back in Mazar-e 
Sharif in the early morning hours on Wednesday. He 
met dozens of journalists who descended on the 
fortress for the first time. Hundreds of bodies lay 
strewn about the fortress: Taliban and Northern 
Alliance.
The next day, Thursday, Northern Alliance 
troops discover Taliban still holed up in the cell 
structure below the pink house. Two days later, 
Saturday, after rocketing, pouring oil, and then 
water, into the cell structure below, 86 Taliban
emerge from below into the courtyard. There are 
two U.S. citizens among them.
The Qala-i Jangi uprising will likely be 
remembered as one of the most brutal moments of 
the war, in part, due to the graphic media coverage 
and the scenes of bodies strewn about the courtyard. 
However, there will also continue to be a number of 
troubling questions regarding the uprising. Was it 
preventable and was it necessary for so many to die 
in the process?
While it has been alleged that the battle was a 
deliberate massacre of the type that has plagued 
Afghanistan for decades, the debacle was more a 
result of a series of mistakes. First, the Taliban 
prisoners were never adequately searched. At least 
one killed himself and a Northern Alliance 
commander by grenade in the desert meeting place 
northeast of Mazar-e Sharif before being taken to 
Qala-i Jangi Fortress on Saturday night. That attack 
should have prompted a thorough search, but none 
was made then, or after the prisoners’ arrival at the 
fort, or on Sunday morning prior to being brought 
out into the courtyard.
Second, when the revolt began the Northern 
Alliance was severely undermanned, by all accounts 
outnumbered by at least 4 to 1. Furthermore, the
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fortress, except for the cell structure below the pink 
house, was never designed as a prison. The Taliban 
were housed less than 20 meters from stockpiled 
weapons—although they were probably unaware of 
this upon entering the fortress.
Third, it seems the prisoners were given no 
adequate guarantees for their safety, and being 
foreigners, may have felt they would surely be killed 
and therefore had nothing to lose. Taliban who 
survived the uprising claim that some in the group 
cried as they were being led into the courtyard 
Sunday morning—certain they were going to be 
killed. Once the uprising began Northern Alliance 
soldiers on the scene seemed to indicate that now, 
since the Taliban had instigated the insurrection, 
they would finish it—there would be no more 
attempts to get the remaining Taliban to surrender.
This reaction to the uprising is similar with what 
General Dostum’s men had to say about the Girl’s 
School massacre in Mazar-e Sharif less than two 
weeks prior. In that event, members of Dostum’s 
forces claim that negotiators were sent into the 
school to discuss the terms of the surrender but were 
killed by the Pakistanis during the negotiation 
process. At which point General Dostum’s forces 
relentlessly attacked the school until all the 600 
Pakistanis inside were killed.
Finally, the CIA operatives in the fortress on 
Sunday did not have adequate backup once the 
uprising began—no quick reaction force outside the 
fortress walls. In addition, they were without vital 
communications equipment and were forced to rely 
on a journalist’s satellite phone to bring in the 
Special Forces. There were also rumors during the 
battle that the initial cause of the uprising may have 
been aggressive reporting. However, since the 
journalists within the fortress on Sunday morning 
were not present in the southern courtyard when the 
revolt began, there has been speculation that this 
reference to journalists may refer to the CIA 
operatives working among the prisoners with their 
digital camera.
Serious questions also remain regarding the 
number of prisoners involved. If, as General 
Dostum’s Political Officer, Olim Razum, claims, up 
to 500 Taliban were in the fortress at the 
insurrection’s beginning, then a significant number 
remain unaccounted for. Pakistanis have resurfaced 
in Pakistan after the incident claiming to have been 
part of the group to taken to the fortress. They claim 
that they escaped during the night and eventually 
made their way out of Afghanistan. Taliban were 
lynched blocks from Qala-i Jangi by local residents
and at least three were found dead outside the 
fortress walls near an open drain pipe.
In the final analysis, the battle of Qala-i Jangi 
provides a window into how the war had been 
conducted up to the more recent Operation 
Anaconda—Taliban versus Northern Alliance, 
supported by Coalition Special Forces and air power. 
It will also be remembered as a bloodbath. However, 
the incident should be considered in light of the 
series of grave errors that led to its tragic conclusion.
Dodge Billingsley is the director of Combat Films 
and Research and was present at the uprising. He 
witnessed the errant U.S. bomb strike and the 
retaking of the southern courtyard by Northern 
Alliance forces.
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IDENTITY, ETHNICITY, AND ETHNOGENESIS: 
The Reintegration of Formerly Deported Crimean Tatars
Shehla Burney
T
he geopolitics of land, ethnicity, and identity 
have indelibly defined the global resurgence 
of new ethnic nationalisms at the turn of the 
millennium, most with horrific consequences of 
“blood and belonging,”1 while a few have resulted in 
a more positive sense of ethnogenesis, or the rebirth, 
reclaiming, and reinventing of ethnocultural identity 
and national self-awareness. From the Himalayas in 
Kashmir, to the plains in Spain, and the once green 
valleys of Kosovo, among other volatile regions of 
the world, “home” and “land” have become lost 
icons for which millions live and die. As borders and 
boundaries are usurped, reclaimed, redrawn in 
almost all the geographic regions of the world—the 
former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Asia, and 
Africa—ethnic hatred, tribal warfare, and territorial 
battles have taken their horrendous toll.2 Ironically, 
as transnational migration continues to soar, for 
more and more marginalized ethnocultural minorities 
the homeland remains only a dream, an imaginary 
state, an unfulfilled reality. But, imaginary 
homelands are more real in exile.
The Tatars of Crimea,3 with a history and culture 
dating back to the 1440s, are a formerly deported 
Turkic people whose undying dreams of returning to 
“Vatan” or the “homeland” on the healing waters of 
the Black Sea, have actually materialized after more 
than half a century of exile, displacement, and 
relentless struggle. The Crimean Tatars' sustained 
effort at reclaiming their homeland, reinventing their 
cultural identity, reviving their lost language, 
reaffirming their cultural practices, retrieving their 
heritage, and retelling their (hi)stories is a 
remarkable testament to their spirit and sense of 
community. Their long and checkered history is the 
story of survival. It is the story of the gradual process 
by which a dispersed and diasporic ethnoreligious 
community with origins in the Crimean Khanate of 
the Middle Ages develops a Modem, secular 
transnational identity and a political attachment to 
the homeland,4 despite a history of more than 200 
years of oppression, displacement, and major social 
and political upheaval.
The means by which the Crimean Tatars have 
managed to forge a national identity and maintain 
their links to the home territory over time and space 
and hardships from the nineteenth-century Ottoman
1. Ignatieff, Michael, Of Blood and Belonging (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1993).
2. The Basques, the Kosovars, the Palestinians, the
Kurds, the Tibetans, the Kashmiris, and the Quebecois,
among many other ethnocultural peoples around the 
globe, are fighting for autonomy and political 
independence, with hopes of acquiring a much dreamed 
of “homeland”., with a distinct society and a separate 
sense of identity. These movements have cost thousands 
of lives and bloodshed. East Timor, was recently 
proclaimed a new state after years of Timorese 
resistance against former Portuguese colonization and 
Indonesian domination.
3. See Allworth, Edward A., ed., The Tatars of Crimea: 
Return to the Homeland (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1998) for a discussion of the origins, language 
and cultural and spiritual heritage of the Crimean Tatars. 
In his preface, Allworth makes a key point about the 
usage of the definite article to refer to the Crimea: “The 
book title also embodies a shift in terminology away 
from the old Western usage that regularly placed the 
definite article the ahead of the place name or ethnonym 
Crimea... like most independent countries and 
autonomous regions, now stand alone without the article 
that formerly introduced , and some felt, demeaned 
them” p.xi.
4 . See Williams, Brian G., The Crimean Tatars, The 




Empire, where they were dispersed after the 
annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 1783, to the 
mass deportation by Stalin to Siberia and Central 
Asia in 1944, to the international political arena of 
the twenty-first century is indeed exemplary of the 
role that exiled peoples and the diasporas can play in 
what I call, “(representing” themselves: “For 
representation is the means by which society re­
presents itself. Re-presentation is a form of naming: 
it is a methodology for reclaiming voice, for 
reaffirming identity... Re-presentation stems from 
the desire to break the hegemony of stereotypes and 
construct an identity that understands geopolitical, 
postcolonial realities.”5
This reclaiming/retrieving of the homeland by the 
Crimean Tatars and the rekindling/reinventing of a 
proud and peaceable ethnic identity is indeed a 
remarkable re-presentation. For a positive 
reaffirmation of ethnicity and identity can often work 
as a corollary to undercut extreme ethnocentrism of 
the deadly kind as seen in the former Yugoslavia. 
However, the early warning systems need to be 
observed carefully. If attention is not paid, the 
Crimean situation too has the potential of escalating 
into another Kosovo. News of the poverty, prejudice, 
poor living conditions, overt racism, ethnic conflict, 
and the denial of political rights of citizenship, of 
education and employment, faced by the Crimean 
Tatars, and their sharp resistance to this hegemonic 
politics of location, has fortunately not yet hit the 
headlines for its fifteen minutes of infamy, soon to 
be relegated to the back pages of memory. The 
media in the West tend to report only disasters from 
the developing world, as Mrs. Indira Gandhi, former 
Prime Minister of India, told me prophetically in an 
interview in 1984,6 a few months before her 
assassination, which was splashed across the front 
pages of the world, while her "green revolution," 
which eradicated famine and made India self- 
sufficient, had been totally ignored.
In this paper I shall first provide a brief 
historical background of the Crimean Tatars and then
5. See Burney, Shehla, “Writing Diaspora: The 
Pedagogy of Re-presentation” in Across the Atlantic: 
The Story of Portuguese Canadians (Toronto: 
Difference Press: 2001), p.vi.
6. Burney, Shehla, "Gandhi: A Woman Charged by
Energy", Interview, The Toronto Star, November 5, 
1984, B4.
discuss the steps being undertaken by the Tatars to 
“re-present” themselves, suggesting key reasons for 
their relative success in reclaiming a new life in an 
old homeland bereft of the comforts of home. The 
proactive measures taken by the Ukrainian 
government in preventing major interethnic conflict 
during the last hectic decade, such as inviting the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
several international and local NGOs to assist in the 
integration and development project, shall also be 
described, based on my own experiences of working 
with students, teachers and community members at 
the UNDP school in Kamenka, outside Simferopol, 
the capital of Crimea, and in various other 
settlements in Bakshiserai, Belagorsk, Sudak, Sari 
Suv, and other cities.
Home and Exile
The Crimean Tatars claim to be the indigenous 
people of Crimea. The powerful independent 
Crimean Khanate, established in 1475 by Khan 
Mengli Giray I, which turned into a dynasty, with 
Bakshesarai as its capital, fostered a period of Tatar 
cultural flowering in literature, architecture, and the 
arts. In 1783, the Crimea was annexed by the 
Russian Empire. At this time, there were an 
estimated 250,000 Tatars, or 90 percent of the 
population, as opposed to only 11.9 percent7 living 
in the peninsula today. After the Russian take-over 
thousands of Tatars were killed, and thousands of 
others fled to the Ottoman Empire. Land 
confiscations by the Russian imperial power from 
the Tatar landowners and farmers impoverished the 
people further, reducing their native population. 
Displacement and migration were heightened in the 
aftermath of the Crimean War of 1853-56, as more 
and more Crimean Tatars found refuge in the 
Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and other places.
A brief surge of indigenization, or “Tatarization” 
as it came to be called in the Crimea, occurred 
between 1920 and 1928 on the basis of early Soviet 
Leninist nationality policy. This came to be known 
in Tatar circles as the golden age of the Soviet 
Crimea. During this period nationality districts and 
village soviets were formed to enhance the status of
7. Certain areas, however, have a larger percentage of 
Tatars: Simferopol, 22.2%; Stari Krym, 27%; 




minorities in places where they formed a majority of 
the population. Guarantees were made for their 
separate cultural development, for primary education 
in the native language and for local self-expression 
in political institutions, including the right to use 
their own language in court. Led by Veli Ibrahimov, 
the Tatars were brought into all levels of the 
Crimea’s government and land was returned to its 
former owners. Tatarization took different forms. 
Elementary schools were established with the Tatar 
language (still in Arabic script) as the medium of 
instruction. An Oriental Institute to study the 
Crimean Tatar language and literature was 
established as were four teachers’ colleges. 
Tatarization was directed towards cultural 
preservation, particularly the salvaging of Tatar 
cultural and religious monuments that had been 
ravaged under Tsarist rule. Publishing in the Tatar 
language flourished and Crimean Tatar cultural 
artefacts were rediscovered. Tatars who had fled 
during the Civil War and War Communism period 
(mostly to Turkey) were granted total amnesty and 
encouraged to return home. This “renaissance” 
ended abruptly with the rise of Stalinism in 1928.8 
According to the 1939 census there were 218,879 
Tatars in the Crimea, making up 19.4 percent of the 
population, still the second highest group after the 
Russians who comprised 49.5 percent of the 
population.9 10Thus, a substantial majority of Tatars 
continued to live on the Crimean coastline until 
World War II.'°
On May 18, 1944, as Hitler's armies marched 
into Crimea, the Tatars were deported en masse by 
the Stalinist regime to Siberia and Central Asia with 
other minorities such as Germans, Bulgarians, 
Armenians and Greeks, allegedly for collaborating 
with the Nazi army. Ironically, the Nazi army razed
8. See Mogocsi, Paul Robert, A History of Ukraine 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. 572- 
582.
9. Figures are taken from The Crimea: Deported 
Citizens Their Return Settlement and Social Adjustment, 
O.A. Gabrielian, V. P. Petrov (Simferopol: AMEHA, 
1997), p. 56.
10. See Magocsi, Paul Robert, Ukraine A Historical
Atlas, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.
to the ground more than 100 Tatar villages.11 Within 
60 hours, 187,859 people were transported from the 
Crimea in 71 charter trains. While the Tatar men 
served in the Soviet army, the women, children and 
the elderly were rounded up from their homes and 
shipped on crowded trains for the Urals, Siberia, and 
Central Asia. About 5,000 other Tatars were sent to 
work in mines. It is believed that hundreds died en 
route, while others perished from malnutrition and 
disease in exile. The Crimean Tatars believe this to 
be ethnic cleansing and have made international 
protests to bring these atrocities to light. In the late 
1950s a national movement for the restoration of 
rights to the Crimean Tatar nation emerged in the 
deportation settlements. Hundreds of petitions were 
circulated and signed and action groups were 
organized. In 1964 the Crimean Tatars began 
formally lobbying Moscow for the return of their 
homeland, restoration of the Crimean Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic, and for political 
rehabilitation, agitating for the retrieval of their lost 
cultural and ethnic identity. By 1973 appeals and 
campaigns were officially successful, but it was not 
until Ukrainian independence in 1991, after more 
than half a century of exile and dislocation, that the 
formerly deported Tatars began to slowly uproot 
themselves from Central Asia to be officially 
returned to their homeland. They, however, arrived 
to find that they no longer possessed their farms and 
lands, that others occupied their ancestral homes, 
that they were now a marginalized minority in the 
changed demographics of Crimea. In a country 
deprived of the old infrastructure of social and 
material well-being after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, they faced discrimination, prejudice and 
poverty. There were few jobs or social services 
available, despite the Ukrainian government’s best 
efforts at employing Crimean Tatars in the state- 
owned sector, which ironically, could not pay regular 
or adequate salaries because of the poor economy. 
Moreover, devaluation caused the meagre savings of 
the Tatars to dwindle further. As Lilya Budzhurova, 
editor in chief of the Crimean Tatar newspaper, 
Avdet, and a popular poet, noted in an address to the 
Harriman Institute in 1998:
11. Information and lists posted on International
Committee for Crimea website
www. iccrimea. org/reports/december 10.html.
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I would like to merely remind you that as a result of 
a policy of genocide that was perpetrated for 
centuries, the final stage of which was the mass 
deportation in 1944, my people have been deprived 
of statehood, homeland, cultural heritage, as well as 
historical and religious memorials.12
Between 1991 and 1995, 256,959 Tatars were 
returned to their homeland, upsetting the fragile 
post-Soviet political and economic apple-cart. The 
stream of repatriation has continued steadily, 
bringing the total to nearly 300,000 returnees, more 
than half of the 500,000 living in exile. With the 
growing numbers of returnees each year, some 
giving up relative prosperity and good jobs in 
Uzbekistan to come home, selling off lands and 
belongings, uprooting themselves yet again, ethnic 
tensions have emerged in an already harsh socio­
economic climate. It has created a new dynamics and 
demographics. These ominous questions of history 
and power, place and identity are breeding mistrust 
and dissension which is quietly brewing in the 
fledgling new settlements of the Crimean Tatars, 
many without electricity and hot water, on unpaved, 
muddy roads, on the outskirts of cities.13 In the early 
years of repatriation hundreds of returnees were 
living in tents and “dug-outs,” without food or 
medicine. Now most Crimean Tatars are building 
their own homes, brick by brick and room-by-room, 
over the years with grit and determination and 
visions of the future, despite the present squalor, 
much to the consternation of the local residents who 
begrudgingly call these dwellings, “mansions.” 
However, whole new neighbourhoods are slowly 
taking shape with mosques, “home schools” and 
other signs of territorial rights. A few collective and 
state-owned farms have been set up in some of the 
new localities of the repatriated Tatars. About half of 
the Crimean Tatars, most of them highly educated
12. Budzhurova, Lilya R., "The Current Socio-political 
Situation of the Crimean Tatars" The Harriman Review 
(Columbia University, New York), vol. 11, nos. 1-2, 
1998.
13. Most settlements are situated outside cities since the 
Crimean Regional Soviet had passed a resolution in the 
early 1990s, limiting the number of resident permits in 
large cities and also prohibiting Tatars from residing in 
resort areas such as Yalta. This resolution has recently 
been rescinded.
and skilled professionals who are unemployed, have 
tried to set up small businesses; others are planting 
gardens, while still others are volunteering for 
community work and school teaching. Despite 
insufficient funding, a Crimean Tatar theater has 
been established, folk music festivals and youth 
camps have been held, and the development of the 
Tatar National art gallery is ongoing. A few Tatar 
schools have been opened but a lot more are needed. 
(See “Education” below.)
In short, in the wake of past and present 
inequities, injustices, unemployment, denial of 
citizenship, and lack of common amenities, the 
Tatars are valiantly struggling to reclaim their 
cultural dignity. Indeed, the Krimsky Tatars are 
fighting to reclaim their homeland, statehood, and 
culture with a passion.
Memory and Myth
This reclaiming/reinventing/representing of 
Crimean Tatars has been wrought, I suggest, through 
three important factors. The primary reason for the 
success of the Tatars, is the result of their higher 
education, professional skills, and technological 
training acquired, ironically, under the vestiges of 
the former Soviet system of education with its high 
standards of excellence and competence. 
Paradoxically, the same Soviet communist regime 
which deported and denigrated them, and which they 
despised, has also provided excellent free education 
and training which has stood the Crimean Tatars in 
good stead in all their battles against the former 
Soviet system as well as the present Ukrainian 
government. As deportees and expatriates they 
understood the value of education. It has helped 
them to organize diligently and to plan intelligently 
in the concerted fight for their human and natural 
rights. As scientists, artists, researchers, intellectuals, 
writers, journalists, doctors, nurses, teachers, 
therapists, engineers, and technicians, educated in 
former Soviet institutions, the Crimean Tatars 
represent all professions and are thus able to use 
their various skills for the benefit of their own 
community when, and as needed.
Another great advantage that the Soviet 
education system provided for the Crimean Tatar 
deportees was the equal rights and education it gave 
to women. Unlike Muslim women in many other 
cultures, Crimean Tatar women are highly educated, 
highly skilled professionals who have taken 
leadership roles in promoting the Tatar cause and in 
setting educational priorities for their children.
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Women represent some of the most impressive 
spokespersons, volunteers, community leaders, 
doctors and teachers I met during my visit to the 
Crimea as part of a recent “multicultural education 
mission” for the United Nations Development 
Program. Women as equals have played a major role 
in nation-building, in educating their children, in 
promoting cultural retrieval through the retelling of 
histories/stories, and in the revival of myths and 
memory. At home they have played a part in 
inculcating in the children, the inheritors of the 
homeland, a patriotic love of country and Tatar 
values, appreciation for dress, customs and language.
Though the former Soviet Education system 
denied Crimean Tatars the privilege of learning their 
own mother tongue, it taught them to excel in 
Russian, a language that they have continued to 
deploy effectively today. Fluency in Russian has 
given them an added linguistic advantage in 
representing themselves to the authorities and in 
communicating across the borders of former Soviet 
states and Eastern Europe. Crimean Tatars also 
understand the significance of learning English as a 
language of international communication and are 
using it effectively for internet technologies. The 
Tatar children are thus taught four languages from an 
early age-Russian, Ukrainian, Tatari, and English. A 
ten-year old boy volunteered to recite a poem in the 
Tatar language titled “Motherland” to welcome us to 
the school at Kamenka.
Secondly, another reason for the success won by 
the Crimean Tatars is their ingrained secularism. 
Secularism, which paradoxically was the cornerstone 
of the former Soviet education system and socialist 
culture, with its sense of respect for otherness and 
difference, informs Crimean Tatar thinking and 
actions as well as Ukrainian culture and life in 
general, despite incidents of racism and xenophobia. 
Though religious revival is a major aspect of 
Crimean Tatar life, only 39.2 percent observe 
religious rites and ritual. There are not many Muslim 
clergy or dogmatic mullahs among the ethnocultural 
group, although several mosques have been returned 
to the repatriates and many new mosques have been 
built. However, outside Muslim interests from 
Turkey and the Middle East have been making 
religious inroads through funding, teaching, and 
other assistance. Thanks to the solid basis of 
secularism of the Soviet era, the Tatars have been 
successful so far in preventing the onslaught of 
extreme Muslim fundamentalism, which no doubt 
has desperately been seeking entry. The teachings
and leadership of secular, modernist intellectual and 
spiritual leaders of the Crimean Tatars, such as 
Ismael Bey Gasparali who is highly revered, has also 
prevented the rise of Muslim religiosity and 
fundamentalism. Indeed, secularism has been an 
extremely positive factor in preventing interethnic 
violence in the Crimea.
Thirdly, the diligent but perilous work of a highly 
acculturated group of repatriates and the 
intelligentsia in conjunction with the elected officials 
of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, a more radical and 
activist organization, has been responsible for 
attempting to build a whole new infrastructure with 
a strong system of education and equal rights and 
opportunities. Thus, intercultural mediation, political 
but peaceful agitation, prioritizing education, timely 
conflict prevention, and pro-active global 
intervention by NGOs and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) at the behest of the 
Ukrainian government, have assisted greatly in 
creating a balanced discourse and a Crimean Tatar 
ethnogenesis, despite the birth pains.
This cultural revival is carefully orchestrated by 
the international Crimean Tatar diaspora in the 
United States, Turkey, Germany, and other places, 
and the expatriates in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
comprised of educated and skilled persons who have 
concertedly helped in the dissemination of 
information, management of websites, protests to the 
proper international authorities, and in the playing 
out of memory and myth of the homeland through 
patriotic poetry, cultural retrieval, and the 
iconization of the Crimea as the “Green Island” 
(Yeshil Ada). Many of the repatriates and the 
members of the diaspora have never before lived in 
Crimea. Yet, the motif of the land, the mountains 
and the sea, drives their nationalistic passion.
At the UNDP school in Kamenka, Simferopol, 
there are no Crimean Tatar books, no curriculum, no 
learning materials that reflect the Tatar culture. 
Tatar histories and stories have been forgotten. Even 
the language has been largely lost. But the process of 
reclaiming and representing goes on. Equipped with 
dozens of donated pens, crayons and colored paper, 
I set to work with the students, encouraging a group 
of 8-12 year-olds to represent themselves in writing 
and drawing. As the retrieval of culture and identity 
is possible through the retelling, replaying and re­
presentation of the 'story' in (hi)story, I ask the 
children to paint their lives. The recurring themes 
that emerge—images of the family, the sea and the 
mountains—reveal the kinds of things that all
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children dream of— home, peace and love. Icons of 
a culture of hospitality and the Tatars' agrarian roots 
appear as recurring motifs of coffee (cava) pots and 
bunches of grapes on little tables in little houses, 
while the sun shines brightly through the blue 
mountains on children wearing Tatar costumes. It is 
interesting to see how these children define their 
sense of identity and homeland through the beautiful 
Crimean landscape. As Northrop Frye says in the 
context of Canadian literature, it is the sense of place 
that is the essence of a sense of identity.14
When I collected the drawings and stories and 
displayed them, the children excitedly exclaimed, “ 
We’ve made a book”!” Having their efforts publicly 
displayed and valued was an important step in 
validating their experiences. Playing with symbols 
and images was the first step in re-presenting 
themselves.
At a roundtable a week later, I received a gift 
from the teacher, Nuriye - a set of “books” made by 
the kids to take back to Canada. “We have learned”, 
said Nuriye in English, “that we can tell our own 
stories, make our own books, and write our own 
histories.”
Integration and Development
In the small peninsula of Crimea with a 
population of only 2.5 million, there are 113 ethnic 
nationalities, making the question of peaceful 
integration more complex and increasing the 
potential for interethnic conflict. As Leonid 
Kravchuk, the first President of Ukraine, writes: 
"Recognizing the need for historical justice, a 
solution must be found which does not create new 
injustices... If radical solutions to this complicated 
issue were pursued, it would be hard to predict the 
future situation on the peninsula."15 Historically, 
poverty and deprivation per se are not necessarily 
the triggers to unrest; but, when inequalities exist on 
the basis of ethnicity, religion, national identity, and 
economic class, or when peoples are exploited, or 
excluded from the process of governance, conflicts 
invariably arise. One Ukrainian scholar’s worst-case 
scenario includes "Crimea's total secession, which 
would be economically inexpedient", or the creation
of "enclaves of warring communities, such as those 
in Lebanon and Cyprus."16
This and other more serious situations have been 
pre-empted so far. In 1995, under the auspices of the 
United Nations Development Program and the 
Ukrainian government, the Crimea Integration and 
Development Program (UNDP/CIDP) was designed 
to facilitate the process of peaceful reintegration, 
conflict prevention, sustainable development, 
capacity building, education, and the construction of 
housing and infrastructure. With financial assistance 
and expertise from UNICEF, UNESCO, and several 
donor countries—Canada, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
the Vatican—and some small NGOs such as the 
Canadian Cooperative Association, Hilfsfund 
Intemationaler (Germany), Wardha Development 
Association (France), and the Centre for Science in 
Villages (India),17 the difficultprojectofresettlement 
was initiated in the face of mounting prejudice.
The quiet, hopeful work that is going on in 
Crimea through the collective efforts of UNDP/CIDP 
and its international and local partners, has been 
largely successful so far thanks to the Tatars' own 
determination and the positive role of other 
stakeholders. The “particip/action” of individuals 
from the community who volunteer their services as 
teachers, social workers, counselors, and group 
leaders is very valuable for the strengthening of 
democratic values and in creating participatory 
approaches to development. At the community hall 
meeting, a respected member of the repatriated 
Tatars, Lutfiye, a handsome older woman wearing a 
fur hat, recites Crimean Tatar poetry with passion 
and vigor. She vivildy recalls the day when she was 
a child of five and her mother and five siblings were 
pulled from their home and huddled into railway 
cars, bound for unknown destinations. But she brings 
a message of peace to the young students. She 
preaches co-existence and the intermingling of 
cultures: “We can see our original family houses 
down the valley, occupied by others. We don't want 
to take them, only to live peacefully as citizens 
building our own homes and lives.”
14. See Frye, Northrop, The Bush Garden,: Toronto: 
McLelland & Stuart,, 1981.
15. Leonid, Information Bulletin,Krimsky Studii, No.l, 
2000.
16. Parakhonssky, Borys, Information Bulletin, 
Krimsky Studii, No. 1, 2000.
17. It is interesting that the big players, the UK, USA, 
and Russia, are conspicuous by their absence.
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The CIDP's goals are to promote a culture of 
peace and stability in Crimea. Its five-point mandate 
is to (1) strengthen local capacity for development, 
(2) reduce socio-economic disparities based on 
ethnicity, (3) promote good governance through 
dialogue and participation, (4) raise tolerance 
through education and culture, and (5) target the 
most vulnerable, that is, women and young people. 
In June 2000, after a Tripartite review, the CIDP was 
extended for another four years so that it continue to 
perform its important role. It was decided that the 
program would be widened to cover three new 
geographic regions.
The CIDP works on a participatory democratic 
approach, with "dialogue" and “local participation” 
as key concepts in governance. Building up the 
human resources of the community to create 
leadership and initiate sustainable development, 
strengthening the capacity of communities to plan, 
mobilize, implement projects, to change attitudes, 
and build the capability of peoples to help 
themselves are all priorities. The CIDP contributes to 
bridging social and economic disparities among 
different ethnic groups by interventions in health, 
education, water supply, sanitation and flood control 
systems, as well as in the development of small and 
medium enterprises. The business development 
centers and the Revolving Loan Fund have provided 
opportunities for employment and income 
generation. The role and status of women in society 
has been a central focus of the project as has been 
the setting up of youth centers and camps to promote 
leadership and friendship among the young people 
from diverse ethnocultural backgrounds.
Phase I of CIDP (1995 to June 1998) saw the 
successful completion of the community school in 
Kamenka, one of the first settlements close to 
Simferopol, which I visited. This was a pilot project 
with the Sudak region, where flood control systems 
were constructed. In Kamenka, a new community 
outpatient clinic and potable water mains were also 
built. With the assistance of Turkey, the Tatars 
constructed a small mosque, which also serves as a 
social meeting place. Repairs were undertaken to 
buildings to set up an Armenian Cultural Center, and 
a Vocational Training Center. Several home-based 
schools were organized for pre-schooling as 
preparation for elementary schools, and for the 
acculturation of Crimean Tatar children.
Education and Acculturation
Education is rightfully considered a priority, 
with an emphasis on teacher-training and 
methodologies for multicultural, multilingual, and 
anti-racist education. It is seen as the primary means 
of building a nation of peace-loving citizens. The 
impressive UNDP school at Kamenka, built by the 
Tatars themselves, seems to be an oasis in a hostile 
environment, providing a meeting place for the 
children as well as the community. This multi-ethnic, 
multi-cultural elementary school is based on the 
principles of racial and gender equity and democratic 
participatory approach. The teachers are bright and 
dedicated and the students are neatly dressed and 
eager to learn. They speak Russian, Ukrainian, and 
the Tatar language, and are soon starting English 
lessons.
A cost-effective, community-based education 
model is practised by the CIDP. The community 
shares in providing home-based schooling premises, 
and is in charge of maintenance, cleaning and 
repairs, thus cutting costs. These home schools 
provide a safe haven for the integration of younger 
children to the new school environment and the 
dominant culture. This early education, which helps 
both the preschoolers and their parents to 
acculturate, is also a means for conflict prevention. 
During Phase II, from October 1998, several home- 
schools were established. A teacher-resource center 
"Mostik" (bridge), has also been created to provide 
teaching methodologies, training and resources to 
teachers. There is also an information and consulting 
center which provides assistance. A children's 
magazine, "Yildyzchik ('starlet') publishes children's 
poems and stories both in the Tatar language and in 
Ukrainian. Special seminars, camps and conferences 
are organized for the youth on leadership, conflict 
prevention skills, and human rights. Youth leaders 
have the opportunity to attend English-language 
classes and selected students take computer literacy 
courses. There is also a non-formal education center 
for the disabled and “at-risk” youth, which consists 
of an internet club and web sites. Crimean Tatar 
students attend university on the quota system, 
graduating in Medicine, Law and the Arts, 
Humanities and Sciences, doing much better than the 
national average.
The focus on youth is important as many of them 
are disenchanted and bored with the current state of 
affairs. They want to bring about immediate social 
change through more aggressive and violent means. 
To enable youth to understand the complex
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questions, act responsibly, and think critically, it is 
very important to create a sense of stability and 
purpose. The young people I worked with seemed 
highly motivated, eager, and intelligent, but there 
were a few who felt strongly that more aggressive 
means were needed to gain equality and change the 
social system.
The mainstream, consolidated gymnasium- 
lyceum style school in Bakshiserai has 3000 
elementary and high school students from all ethnic 
groups, but the majority are Ukrainian and Russian. 
The school seems to be fairly well-equipped, well- 
managed and lively with boisterous children and 
teenagers. With a large staff of teachers, including an 
Armenian and a Tatar, it is run by the ministry of 
education. It practices a “multicultural,” multilingual 
education policy that equally values all cultures. The 
school had decided to mount a concert in honour of 
the foreign visitors. There was music, dance and 
drama representing the diverse cultures: the 
flamenco, Cossack dancing, tableaux, songs in 
several languages, and a Tatar play in traditional 
Tatar costumes, from a fable or folk tale. And there 
was the ballet, of course. But this exquisite 
performance was ingeniously mixed with Indian 
classical bharatyanatam within the ballet style. The 
costumes were designed with Indian motifs but were 
ballet-like.
This intermingling and normalizing of various 
cultural forms from the East and the West at a school 
performance was a pleasant experiment in 
intercultural representation. There was no 
exoticizationhere, or appropriation, just an aesthetic 
blending, a borrowing, and juxtaposition of the arts. 
But then, the “Other” seems to be valued here as the 
“supplement of knowledge,” in Jacques Derrida's 
phrase18 unlike the ingrained Eurocentrism of the 
typical curriculum that shuts out what Edward Said 
calls the “World as Text,”19 excluding the Other 
from mainstream discourse.
In Yalta on the southeastern coast of the Black 
Sea, with its therapeutic waters and curative air of 
scented pines, there are no Crimean Tatar 
settlements: the local authorities had opposed their 
return by denying them land and resident permits.
Yalta is famous for its Summer Palaces of the Tsars 
and the Yalta Treaty ending the Second World War, 
signed by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, at the 
beautiful Livadia Palace in 1945. The decisions 
taken at this historic meeting shaped the geopolitics 
that governed the world for half a century, including 
the fate of the Krimsky Tatars. Today the Crimean 
Tatars are involved in retrieving their own fate and 
in reclaiming/reinventing and re-presenting 
themselves.
Shehla Burney teaches Cultural Studies at the 
Faculty of Education, Queen's University, Canada. 
Her research interests lie in postcolonial and 
poststructuralist theory, critical pedagogy, 
representation, reception, and ethnocultural history
She was invited by the United Nations 
Development Program on a multicultural education 
mission to work with Crimean Tatar teachers, 
students and community at the UN school in 
Simferopol and other cities, Bachshiserai, 
Belagorsk, and Yalta, which she hopes to visit again 
in May 2003. She has also sponsored two Crimean 
university students to Canada for internships with 
the Canada-Ukraine Parliamentary Program.
18. See Derrida, Jacques, Positions, Chicago;
University of Chicago Press, 1986.
19. See Said, Edward, The World, the Critic and the 
Text, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988.
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M
ore than a decade after the implosion of the 
CPSU leadership (i.e., the Soviet system) 
the Western-style, free market Russia that 
many in the West desired has yet to appear. As the 
principal successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia 
currently resides in the twilight zone of both being 
ally and rival to the West, evolving as a complex 
political hybrid that defies precise categorization. It 
has also defied Western (predominantly American) 
attempts to assign it the role of quiescent and 
cooperative junior partner in Bush the Elder’s “new 
world order.” Of course, as Jeffrey Surovell argues 
throughout his provocative monograph, Capitalist 
Russia and the West, the days of superpower parity 
are long gone. Indeed, Surovell captures an 
important aspect of the new status quo, 
demonstrating throughout his treatise that Russia’s 
dependency on the West “is not a totally 
harmonious, smooth, and mutually coordinated 
affair, but entails bargaining for advantage, give- 
and-take, even threat among the various parties.”1 
This is reflected clearly by a recent statement in 
which President Putin emphasized “that Russia must 
learn to protect its position in a world characterized
by extremely cruel competition, especially 
economically. Russia has no special claims in the 
world, but insists upon treatment commensurate with 
i s history, potential and enormous size.2 Capitalist 
Russia and the West comprises a thorough (indeed, 
year by year) accounting of Russia’s slide from a 
power broker of highly heralded summits to the 
pawnbroker for conventional weapons and nuclear 
technology. The point of departure for Surovell’s 
take on Russia is a deep grounding in dependency 
theory as well as class-based (mainly Marxist) 
approaches to politics and society. This leads to an 
inevitable stress on economic issues, both on the 
domestic and international levels. This is both a 
strength and a weakness, as Surovell endeavors to 
explain the post-Communist incarnation of Russia’s 
social order in terms of the enduring struggle of 
international capital and labor.
Surovell’s reliance on such extrinsic factors 
perhaps undervalues the self-destructive, reactionary 
impulses of Russian society that fuel the many 
conspiracy theorists in the Russian Federation who 
blame America for dragging it down. Despite the 
international sympathy following the events of
1. Surovell, Capitalist Russia and the West, p. 280. 2. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 110, part 1, 13 June 2002.
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September 11, anti-Americanism in Russia 
intensified, mainly due to Russian perceptions of the 
widening military and economic gap between the 
two countries. According to a poll conducted by the 
All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion 
(VTsIOM) in March 2002, only 17 percent of 
Russians see the United States as a friendly state, 
while 71 percent held the opposite view. This was a 
sharp increase over the agency's 2001 poll on the 
same topic, in which only 44 percent felt the U.S. 
not to be a friend. The main reasons for increased 
anti-American sentiment were suspicions about 
NATO and Russia's failures in the Winter Olympic 
Games. Only 7 percent were willing to take the 
U.S. side in conflicts with Iraq, Iran, or Syria, while 
20 percent feel that Russia should side with those 
countries.3 Meanwhile, influential journalists and 
intellectuals have developed the habit of asserting 
their country's “decisive edge” over the U.S. in 
terms of culture and morals (loudly and publicly), 
haranguing the U.S. for its attempts to subvert 
Russian culture and values, and denouncing America 
for its “black ingratitude”—an oft-used term in the 
Russian media.4 Even President Putin has engaged in 
cultural one-upmanship, dragging the Bushes 
through a crash course in Russian high culture 
during their visit to St. Petersburg. The nightly news 
on Russia’s NTV “showed Putin's surprised look 
when President Bush took out his chewing gum 
while marveling at the decorations in the Kremlin.”5 
Of course, rather than cultural one-upmanship this 
might simply be Putin’s revenge for having to spend 
time at the presidential ranch in Crawford, Texas, in 
November 2001.
Such cultural exchanges aside, Russian 
perceptions of American culpability for their 
misfortunes remains problematic. This was 
particularly the case regarding instances such as the 
much-ballyhooed ice-skating controversy, and the 
disqualification of Russian athletes for alleged use of 
banned substances. The hysteria began when the 
figure skating results were revised and Russian 
skiers were removed from the competition on doping
allegations. During the February 2002 Winter 
Olympics even the mainstream Russian media 
coverage was awash in accusations that the US was 
somehow working behind the scenes to undermine 
Russian athletes: “a wave of anti-Americanism of 
unseen might literally inundated Russian TV.” Much 
of the Russian media pointed to an alleged 
conspiracy to humiliate Russia at the Olympics, 
charging that the U.S. ran the Games for its own 
benefit. So-called “anonymous forces” in the US 
supposedly bribed judges, shamelessly “stole medals 
from Russia,” and fabricated doping charges against 
“innocent” Russian athletes, “literally sucking extra 
blood from them for unnecessary tests.”6
Perhaps what is most striking about the 
“Olympic hysteria” was that it was fanned by 
Russian political officials at the highest levels, 
including Putin (who later backtracked) and 
members of the State Duma, who passed a resolution 
condemning the treatment of Russia and called for a 
boycott of the Games. This was followed by another 
round of hysterical anti-American propaganda, this 
time centered upon the bankruptcy of the famous 
Victor Kamkin Russian bookstore in New York 
City. Because no one had wanted to buy the two 
million Russian texts remaining in the store's 
inventory, the idea of simply destroying the books 
had been suggested. The Russian media seized upon 
the circumstances of the bankruptcy, as an attack on 
Russian culture: some deliberate American policy of 
burning Russian books.7 Because media outlets 
throughout the Russian Federation receive some 
measure of government subsidy and/or have outside 
sponsors or private owners with political 
connections, editorial independence has been 
increasingly threatened. Officials exert political 
pressure, both at the national and regional levels, and 
with major media outlets increasingly controlled by 
big financial groups, media outlets inevitably reflect 
their political biases and the battles of the business 
concerns that control them. Freedom House’s annual 
Survey of Press Freedom has consistently rated 
Russia “Partly Free” since 1992. Continued assaults
3. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Volume 6, No. 46, Part I, 11 March 2002. 
The poll was conducted among 1,500 respondents in 44 regions 
of Russia.
4. Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Rise of Russian Anti- 
Americanism after September 2001: Envy as a Leading Factor,” 
Johnson's Russia List, #6227, 7 May 2002.
5. Peter Rutland, “Putin’s Levitation Act,” Russia and Eurasia
Review, Volume 1, no. 1,4 June 2002, Jamestown Foundation.
6. For a treatment of the anti-American tenor of the Russian 
media, particularly regarding the 2002 Winter Olympics, see 
Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Rise of Russian Anti-Americanism 
after September 2001: Envy as a Leading Factor,” Johnson's 
Russia List, #6227, 7 May 2002.
7. Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Rise of Russian Anti-Americanism 
after September 2001: Envy as a Leading Factor,” Johnson's 
Russia List, #6227, 7 May 2002.
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upon the independence of media outlets have 
seriously eroded even this meager standard. Those 
media outlets that offer alternative viewpoints and 
analysis quickly fmd themselves facing substantial 
legal and financial obstacles. Journalists and media 
owners critical of the Putin regime come under 
intense scrutiny, including arbitrary audits, 
complicated legal battles, and occasionally even 
beatings (always by “unknown assailants”).8
This state of affairs, however, has not 
engendered significant political or social protest: 
something difficult for many of us diehard “First 
Amendment” advocates to fathom. Most Russians 
seem relatively comfortable with “the media as a 
political player, rather than as an unbiased watchdog 
or commentator on political life.” In fact, they even 
“expect television to instill a sense of pride about the 
country and find news coverage of Chechnya, 
corruption, crime, and other problems depressing 
and unpatriotic.”9 As Georgy Bovt points out, from 
about 1985 to 1992 media outlets (especially the 
press) enjoyed ever-expanding audiences and newly- 
found prestige. However, the period of market 
reforms brought with it increased production costs 
and more competition. Prices rose as incomes fell, 
opening up media outlets to a new set of commercial 
and political vulnerabilities. Moreover, the 1990s 
witnessed a sharp veering toward unprofessional, 
exploitative, and corrupt trends in journalism (a 
pattern not unknown in the West), further alienating 
the Russian public.10 Journalists are generally seen 
by the public as little more than the front men for the 
media tycoons who looted the country’s assets, 
building vast fortunes and patronage networks. Thus, 
they enjoy little sympathy or respect from the tens of 
millions who live at or near the poverty line. Indeed, 
the type of journalism upon which their media 
empires were built leaves a great deal to be desired. 
Moreover, business firms and other self-interested 
parties are able to procure almost any story they 
want on Russian television by resorting to bribes. Of 
course, there are many sincere, independent, hard­
working journalists in Russia, even among the
8. See my chapter in Nations in Transit on the political, 
economic, and social developments in Russia during 2001, 
published by Freedom House (Summer 2002).
9. Sarah Oates’ chapter on “Politics and the Media,” in White, 
Pravda, and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, 
p. 266.
10. Georgy Bovt, “The Russian Press and Civil Society,” in 
Marsh and Gvosdev, eds., Civil Society and the Search for Justice 
in Russia, pp. 97-98.
entities mentioned above, but their efforts are 
overshadowed and undermined by the manipulation 
of speech freedoms by both the government and its 
political rivals.11
Thus, it was likely a combination of factors, such 
as a desire to regain its appeal to a wide audience via 
patriotic themes, an inability to accept the fact of (or 
responsibility for) the decline of Russia’s once 
internationally dominant athletic program, and one 
suspects political influence and opportunism, that 
yielded this past spring’s virulent anti-Western 
(mainly anti-American) turn in the Russian press. 
Indeed, in a succinct chapter that deals with many of 
the myriad problems and temptations dogging the 
Russian media, Brad Owens strikes a somewhat 
more optimistic note regarding the trajectories and 
potential development of the fourth estate in the 
Russian Federation. He feels that “Russian 
journalists are beginning to come to terms with the 
high costs of ‘selling out’ to economic interests with 
political agendas.”12 Moreover, some journalists did 
resist the temptation to interpret Russia's lackluster 
Olympic performance as a triumph of America’s 
principal foreign policy agenda; the continued 
subjugation and humiliation of great Russia. 
Curiously, factors such as the rampant corruption 
endemic in Russia’s sports agencies, the lack of 
proper training facilities, and the pitiful 
underfunding by the government of aspiring athletes, 
were rarely cited as contributing elements to 
Russia’s disappointing Olympic performance. 
Perhaps the phrase used by Russian journalist Irina 
Petrovskaya to describe the situation fits best: 
“Patriotism is the last refuge for a bad dancer.”13
But while holding the line against imperialism’s 
underhanded designs to weaken Mother Russia 
might be the preferred hobbyhorse of some portion 
of the leadership elite, the Russian foreign policy 
course entails a wider array of factors and actors. 
Alex Pravda’s chapter on foreign policy in 
Developments in Russian Politics attempts to sort 
out the often incoherent and ambivalent post- 
Communist foreign policy trends of the former 
Superpower. Pravda, long one of the most astute
11. Editorial, “Free Media, Free of Crooks,” The Russia Journal, 
issue 35 (78), 9 September 2000.
12. Brad Owens, “The Independent Press in Russia: Integrity and 
the Economics of Survival,” in Marsh and Gvosdev, eds., Civil 
Society and the Search for Justice in Russia, p. 110.
13. Cited in Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Rise of Russian Anti- 
Americanism after September 2001: Envy as a Leading Factor,” 
Johnson's Russia List, #6227, 7 May 2002.
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observers of the Russian foreign policy scene, 
analyzes Russian trends and actions in terms of 
policy towards the “near abroad” (i.e., the former 
Soviet republics) versus policy towards the “far 
abroad.” Russian policies concerning the near 
abroad have in essence lacked requisite drive and 
effectiveness, and their overall weakness can be 
traced “to a combination of complacency, unclear 
roles and institutional ambiguities... neither simply a 
policy of aggressive neo-imperialism nor one of 
liberal cooperation.”14 For example, despite lingering 
antipathy toward their “Baltic brothers,” for their 
alleged abuse of ethnic Russians,15 the Russian 
diaspora in the FSU has never been a priority in 
Russian foreign policy. Early rumblings about 
“protecting Russians in Latvia and Estonia from 
human rights violations” yielded to tacit 
acknowledgment that ethnic Russians living in the 
Baltics states enjoy higher living standards than 
most citizens of the Russian Federation.16
Moreover, any talk of obstructing Baltic efforts 
to join the EU and NATO is no longer taken 
seriously. The same can likely be said of any real 
Russia-Belarus Union. As Surovell notes in his 
critique of Russia’s abdication of a strong CIS, there 
has been a distinct slowdown in the Belarus-Russia 
rapprochement that had been pushed by Yeltsin, 
particularly a reticence to establish anything 
meaningful in terms of economic integration or 
supranational political bodies.17 In June 2002 Putin 
was vocal in his criticism of proposals presented by 
Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka 
concerning integration of the two countries, accusing 
Belarus of trying to recreate the USSR on the basis 
of Russia's economic might, emphasizing that the 
Belarussian economy equals just 3 percent of
14. Alex Pravda’s chapter on “Foreign Policy,” in White, Pravda, 
and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, pp. 216, 
218.
15. A poll conducted by the Institute of Sociology and reported 
by The St. Petersburg Times on 4 September 2001 found that 
20% of the residents of the northern capital view Estonia and 
Lithuania as enemies of Russia, and that 25% have that opinion of 
Latvia. Outside the city, in Leningrad Oblast, the poll found, 
those figures were even higher. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 5, no.
170, part 1, 7 September 2001.
16. For example, the Latvian magazine Klubs, which regularly 
publishes lists of the country’s wealthiest people, reports that 
nearly half of Latvia's some 100 millionaires are Russian 
speakers. Valentinas Mite, “Latvia: Russian Speakers Hold Their 
Own On The Business Front,” RFE/RL Report, Prague, 17 May 
2002.
17. Surovell, Capitalist Russia and the West, p. 258.
Russia's. He also rejected what he termed a 
“supranational organ with undefined functions,” 
effectively setting aside proposals that were largely 
endorsed in the past by former President Boris 
Yeltsin.18
Indeed, it is the Caucasus and Central Asia that 
have most bedeviled Russian policy-makers. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union left the rump federation 
with large sections of undefended frontiers and 
neighbors too weak to secure the previously well- 
fortified Soviet borders; moreover, the new 
governments of the southern tier of the FSU have 
had difficulty quelling local conflicts and combating 
extremist influences. Moscow has alternately 
attempted harder (interventionist) and softer, more 
even-handed tactics in dealing with this portion of 
the near abroad. Recent events have again raised the 
possibility of military intervention to neutralize the 
threat posed by the presence of militants in 
Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, often a staging ground for 
extremist elements who operate in Chechnya. In any 
event, the costs of security have not been 
unsubstantial, and “Russia has had to bear the cost 
of security for the benefits of exercising control.”19
Russian policy regarding the far abroad has also 
traversed a complex path of twists and turns, with 
President Putin embarking on a less than popular 
pro-American stance in the wake of September 11th. 
While Putin’s course of cozying up to the West fits 
square with Jeffrey Surovell’s argument that post- 
Communist Russian leaders knuckle under to the 
dictates of capital (and hence capital’s military 
enforcer, the U.S.), the sudden turn did take some 
analysts by surprise. As Peter Rutland put it, “Putin 
talked the talk, but he also walked the walk, making 
a stream of hitherto unimaginable concessions.”20 
Russian acquiescence to the unilateral U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM treaty, to the stationing of 
American forces (and influence) into the FSU 
(especially Tajikistan and Georgia), to the expansion 
of NATO to include the Baltic states, not to mention 
the conduct of a war in neighboring (and former
18. See RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 111, part 1, 14 June 
2002; and RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 118, part 1,25 June 
2002. For more on this, see Jan Maksymiuk, “A Union 
Fractured,” RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 114, part 1, 19 June 
2002.
19. Alex Pravda’s chapter on “Foreign Policy,” in White, Pravda, 
and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, pp. 222- 
223. The quote is on p. 223.
20. Peter Rutland, “Putin’s Levitation Act,” Russia and Eurasia 
Review, vol. 1, no. 1,4 June 2002, Jamestown Foundation.
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client) Afghanistan, certainly provides grist for those 
who argue that Russia is selling out to the West.
In fact, I would argue that given such a weak 
hand (due to Russia’s poor economic situation, lack 
of powerful allies, and the deterioration of its 
military establishment), the Russian President has 
done well. The long overdue shift from pretensions 
of a detente-era global superpower to a more tenable 
role as a European power better suit Russia’s 
capabilities, if not its nostalgic sensibilities. The 
replacement last year of Defense Minister Igor 
Sergeev with Sergei Ivanov, a KGBist and close 
Putin ally, as well as the removal of General Leonid 
Ivashov as head of the Defense Ministry’s 
international department augurs well for such 
changes. Likewise, the naming of a (female!) 
civilian to oversee the army budget is a positive step. 
On the global scale, then, Russia simply cannot 
contend for parity with the U.S., but in specific 
regions (especially in the Caucasus and in Central 
Asia), Russia in fact can function as a senior partner 
to its Western allies. Indeed, an increasingly 
stretched U.S. military welcomes Russia’s help in 
such troublesome areas. Taking its cue from the 
positional shifts of the UK and France in the post- 
World War II years, Russia might be able to carve 
out a juicy role in the new world order, one based on 
such a notion of global cooperation and regional 
(though not international) parity between Russia and 
the United States.21
Of course the question of just how long Putin can 
keep up this pro-Western position in spite of the 
prevailing opinions in Russian society still remains. 
This is particularly true given the intractability of 
Russia’s domestic political scene. It is on issues 
relating to such themes that concerns the bulk of the 
works and authors reviewed here. A set of issues that 
perhaps bridges the gap between domestic and 
international policy spheres is the deteriorating state 
of the Russian military and the (not unrelated) war in 
Chechnya. The post-Communist Russian military, as 
Zoltan Barany illustrates in his effective chapter- 
length study, has become “a weak, disorganized 
institution marked by low morale and pitiful material
21. On this notion of regional parity, see Nikolai Zlobin, “Being a 
junior partner to the US is not demeaning: Russia just needs to 
understand where its interests coincide with American interests,” 
World Energy Policy Journal, #4, June 2002 <www.wep.ru> 
Available on Johnson‘s Russia List, #6317,20 June, 2002.
conditions.”22 The rank and file had never 
understood what was expected of them in the era of 
glasnost and perestroika-, and the vacillations and 
indecision of Gorbachev’s policies and the clear 
defeat in Afghanistan cost the military establishment 
its prestige, privileges and political clout. The 
Yeltsin era meant further unpredictability and 
disorientation for the military, as organizational 
shifts and informal political power arrangements 
combined with budgetary cuts to enfeeble the once 
mighty military-industrial complex. This trend was 
exacerbated by another disastrous war in Chechnya 
(1994-96) and Yeltsin’s divide et imperia strategy of 
creating multiple military establishments, which vied 
for both funds and power.23 Military life under Putin 
shows little improvement. Chief of the General Staff 
Anatoly Kvashnin reported on May 30, 2002, that 
“the situation in the Russian Army is worse than 
critical,” that the military is riddled by 
embezzlement and plunder, arguing that if radical 
measures are not taken “the declining level of its 
combat readiness may become irreversible.”24
Conscription rates have fallen precipitously 
while desertion rates and instances of corruption and 
abuse within the military have skyrocketed. The 
acting head of the General Staffs Organizational- 
Mobilization Department, Colonel General Vasily 
Smirnov, announced that only 11 percent of draftees 
called up in the course of the 2002 spring draft were 
suitable for the military service.25 In June, 
Prosecutor-General Ustinov, reported to the 
Federation Council that criminal investigations are 
under way concerning 19 senior military officers 
who “exceeded their authority, took possession of 
state property, or disposed improperly of state 
property.”26 At the lower end of the spectrum, 46 
percent of Russian soldiers live at or below the 
poverty line, and as of the third week of July 2002, 
about 1.2 million officers and soldiers still had not 
received their wages for June. According to one 
soldier quoted in the German daily Die Welt, “we
22. Zoltan Barany, “Politics and the Russian Armed Forces,” in 
Barany and Moser, eds., Russian Politics: Challenges of 
Democratization, p. 175.
23. Zoltan Barany, “Politics and the Russian Armed Forces,” in 
Barany and Moser, eds., Russian Politics: Challenges of 
Democratization, pp. 177, 186-187.
24. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 101, part 1,31 May 2002.
25. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 128, part 1, 11 July 2002. He 
also noted that 20% of draftees have only an elementary-school 
education and about 7% have criminal records.
26. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 111, part 1, 14 June 2002.
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live worse than homeless people, and this can't 
continue any longer.”27 The lack of funds seriously 
undermines current discussions about shifting the 
military to a professional-contract basis, a subject 
that continues to be bandied about. If Barany is 
correct in his findings that Russian military forces 
are characterized by poor training, insufficient 
maintenance of aging equipment, and unprofessional 
behavior, that conscripts (that is, those who don’t 
run away) are deployed for berry-picking, 
mushrooming and harvesting in order to procure 
sufficient food, and that “hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers must serve without proper uniforms, boots, 
and basic equipment,” I doubt that the best and the 
brightest will be likely to enlist in any future 
professional army.28
The current war in Chechnya merely exacerbates 
an already dire situation. Originally popular with a 
Russian public weary of continued terrorist acts, 
kidnapping, and lawlessness emanating from 
Chechnya, the war grinds on, albeit with decreasing 
support and seemingly no end in sight. In April 2002 
Putin was quoted as follows: “Regarding Chechnya, 
the military phase is over thanks to the bravery of 
the army and special task forces.”29 Perhaps he was 
studying films of General Westmoreland reassuring 
the American public about Vietnam before Tet 
(1968), since the resistance in Chechnya shows no 
signs of abating. In fact, this past summer Putin even 
named a new commander for the Joint Federal 
Forces in Chechnya, Lieutenant General Sergei 
Makarov. The new commander certainly has his 
work cut out for him. While performing far better 
than in the previous Chechen War, Russian forces 
have yet to see the light at the end of the tunnel. The 
Russian government compares its fight with 
separatist rebels to the U.S. war against terrorism in 
Afghanistan. Of course, the fact that Russian forces 
have been accused of repeated violations of human 
rights including murder, rape, theft, kidnapping and 
extortion make the comparison a stretch. 
Consequently, various journalists, representatives of 
human rights organizations, and international 
political leaders (e.g., recent comments by Mary 
Robinson and Joschka Fischer), continue to criticize 
Moscow for abuses committed by Russian forces.
27. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 136, part 1, 23 July 2002.
28. Zoltan Barany, “Politics and the Russian Armed Forces,” in 
Barany and Moser, eds., Russian Politics: Challenges of 
Democratization, pp. 208, 211.
29. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 73, part 1, 18 April 2002.
Despite sagging enthusiasm for Putin’s 
Chechnya crusade, the Russian president retains 
widespread support. According to the latest 
(Summer 2002) VTsIOM poll, 73 percent of 
Russians approve of President Putin's performance, a 
figure that has changed little over the past two 
years.30 This is perhaps due to the dearth of 
alternatives, as no other figure enjoys significant 
national support. Christopher Marsh makes clear in 
his study of elections and voters in Russia that 
Russian democracy has yet to face a real “turnover 
test,” since Boris Yeltsin yielded the power to Putin, 
in a legal, but dubious scenario that disadvantaged 
an already fractured democratic-reformist elite and a 
Communist opposition still unable to transform 
social and economic deprivation into political 
control. Still, one must give credit where credit is 
due. Putin ran an outstanding campaign, avoiding 
televized debates and refusing to provide specific 
policy prescriptions, remaining “above politics,” and 
capitalizing on his role in executing the initial 
“revenge phase” of the Second Chechen War.31
Whether or not Russian democratization suffered 
as a result of the tainted presidential elections of 
1996 and 2000 remains to be seen, but Russia’s 
citizenry clearly supports the current president. 
Since the presidency was handed over to him at the 
beginning of 2000, Putin has shown himself at times 
to be a skillful politician, while at other times more 
the heavy-handed autocrat. As is clear from Robert 
Moser’s excellent review of the subject in Russian 
Politics, Putin’s popularity has allowed for a 
substantial change in the nature of executive- 
legislative relations in Russia. Consequently, 
Yeltsin’s political weakness in the final years of his 
tenure “was not institutionalized into a lasting 
redistribution of power between the executive and 
legislative branches.”32 * *In fact, it is in the treatment 
of the diverse areas that make up the wider 
framework of government that the authors under 
review here make their strongest contribution.
30. VTsIOM (All-Russian Center for the Study of Public 
Opinion) surveyed 1,600 people in 33 Russian regions. RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 144, part 1, 2 August 2002. For a critique 
of the methods and results of blatantly pro-Putin polling, see the 
article by Alexander Nadzharov in Novye Izvestia, 28 November 
2001.
31. Christopher Marsh, Russia at the Polls: Voters, Elections, and 
Dernocratceatioti, pp. 111-118.
32. Robert Moser, “Executive-Legislative Relations in Russia,
1991-1999,” in Barany and Moser, eds., Russian Politics:
Challenges of Democratization, p. 97.
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Thomas Remington and Matthew Wyman’s chapters 
on legislative process and voters in Developments in 
Russian Politics provide valuable material to 
complement nicely both the Marsh book (mentioned 
above) and the analytical chapter by Michael 
McFaul of Russian electoral trends in the Barany 
and Moser volume.
A specific theme that permeates analyses of 
contemporary Russian society is the notion of the 
“rule of law,” which impacts the crucial areas of 
economic reform, crime and corruption, civil 
society, and the sense of justice. Russia’s 
constitution gives the president unusually strong 
powers, including the right to issue legally binding 
decrees and directives, as well as to appoint senior 
members of the judicial and executive branches. 
Presidential decrees and directives may, like other 
laws, be appealed to the Constitutional Court if held 
to violate the constitution. However, the Court does 
not have the right to select issues for consideration 
on its own initiative, and the range of those bodies 
that may submit issues to it is limited. Even when 
the Constitutional Court has made a ruling, no 
mechanism exists for enforcing the ruling. In 
general, court rulings do not constitute a source of 
legislation under the Russian legal system.33
Post-Communism has witnessed soaring rates of 
street crime plague Russian society, while organized 
crime groups operate with impunity. For example, 
carj ackers stole the $100,000 BMW used by the wife 
of Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov in broad daylight 
in St. Petersburg on July 31, 2002. The thieves 
allegedly sprayed mace in the face of the driver as he 
waited near Gryzlov's apartment and made off with 
the car.34 According to Louise Shelley, the criminal 
justice system reveals very selective enforcement of 
the law with most individuals arrested for crimes 
from the lowest economic and social levels of 
society.35 In many cases, however, the poorer 
defendants receive little in the way of useful legal 
assistance because funds are lacking to pay for trial 
attorneys and many public defenders are poorly
33. For example, Moscow’s Mayor Luzhkov has been able to 
ignore numerous rulings by the Constitutional Court which say by 
retaining the notorious Soviet-era propiska, or system of 
residence permits, his administration is violating Federation 
citizens’ constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of 
movement.
34. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 142, part 1,31 July 2002.
35. Louise Shelley’s chapter on “Crime and Corruption,” in 
White, Pravda, and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian 
Politics 5, pp. 239, 243.
trained. In his thorough assessment of the 
development of a law-based state in the Russian 
Federation, Gordon Smith emphasizes that laws and 
codes are not sufficient for the rule of law to exist, 
that also necessary are sufficient funds, equipment, 
personnel, and other resources to function 
effectively.36 Herein lies much of the problem for 
post-Communist Russia. Overall, judicial 
independence in Russia is seriously threatened by 
the chronic lack of funding. Local courts have 
problems meeting their wage bills, buying 
equipment, paying telephone bills, and undertaking 
building repairs. This makes them easy targets for 
bribery and corruption.37 Some Union of Right 
Forces deputies in the Duma have called for 
extensive judicial-legal reform regarding current 
methods of financing the courts, as well as for large 
sums of money to be allotted to intensify and speed 
up judicial reform. Judges such as Sergei Pashin 
harbor strong doubts about the Kremlin's dedication 
to reforming the legal system, since, in the words of 
Pashin “the government's financial decisions so far 
show that legal reform is far from being a priority.”38 
As part of a major judicial reform, a new Criminal 
Procedure Code came into force on July 1, 2002, 
aimed at enhancing the rights of suspects by 
requiring warrants for searches and arrests. It also 
stipulates that a first interrogation of a suspect be 
held within 24 hours of detention, and that the 
suspect has the right to consultation with an attorney 
prior to it. The new code also attempts to give more 
power to defense attorneys by allowing them to 
conduct independent investigations of the case.39
While most analysts focus upon the institutions 
and laws necessary for the functioning of a market 
democracy in Russia, there is a conceptual element
36. Gordon Smith, “Russia and the Rule of Law," in White, . 
Pravda, and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, 
pp. 222-223. The quote is on p. 112.
37. Judges frequently were paid bonuses by governors out of 
their regional budgets. For example, until last year Moscow 
Mayor Yury Luzhkov paid judges regular bonuses of$100- 
200/month to supplement their inadequate federal wages. Thus it 
is not surprising that while Luzhkov was providing the bonuses, 
he did not lose a single case he brought against newspapers that 
criticized him. Last fall, the Kremlin publicly criticized Luzhkov 
for this practice. Sophie Lambroschini, “Judge's Dismissal 
Underlines Problems Facing Russian Judiciary,” RFE/RL 
Newsline, Volume 4, No. 205, Part I, 23 October 2000.
38. Sophie Lambroschini, “Judge's Dismissal Underlines 
Problems Facing Russian Judiciary,” RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 4, 
no. 205, part 1, 23 October 2000.
39. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 123, part 1, 2 July 2002.
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to the “rule of law” dilemma as well. Steven Fish 
stakes out a clearly American-centric view of 
Russian society, asserting that an overwhelming 
proportion of citizens do not regard subordinating 
themselves to the laws as obligatory or even 
desirable, and emphasizing their contempt for the 
mundane but crucial rules and laws that regulate 
daily life. “Just as state officials ignore citizens’ 
preferences, so too do citizens ignore the state’s 
dictates.” 40 Hence the argument made by Louise 
Shelley that “the pervasive corruption and the 
penetration of organized crime into the state and 
economy cannot be explained only by the failure to 
create institutions and norms.”41
After decades of a restrictive Communist order, a 
general societal contempt for law and for 
government should not have come as a surprise. This 
has been exacerbated by perceptions in Russia that 
market democracy, despite its great promises, has 
impoverished a once great society.
True, a small stratum of society has garnered 
great wealth, but the fruits of capitalism have yet to 
“trickle down” to the bulk of the population. 
Despite a recovering economy, Russian society 
remains divided between the very “haves” and the 
“have-nots.” The income gap in Russia reached 
levels of disparity characteristic of many African 
countries, while life expectancy fell so precipitously 
that Russia now ranks 60th in the world, according 
to UN statistics.42 Perhaps the market system itself is 
less to blame than those who were responsible for its 
implementation. This includes both Russian and 
Western policy-makers and advisers. In an excellent 
critique of the course of economic reform in the 
1990s, Yoshiko Herrera convincingly shows how 
both advisers and reformers failed to approach 
economic reform with a proper appreciation of the 
complexity of markets, that is, as they actually exist 
in capitalist economies. In Herrera’s words, “the 
superior ability of markets in handling economic 
problems was not replicated in the post-socialist 
Russian context simply by the quick transfer of 
outdated, but ideologically appealing, metaphors.”43
40. M. Steven Fish, “Conclusion: Democracy and Russian 
Politics,” in Barany and Moser, eds., Russian Politics: Challenges 
of Democratization, p. 225.
41. Louise Shelley, “Crime and Corruption,” in White, Pravda, 
and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, p. 245.
42. See the article by Stanislav Kondrashov in Vremya MN on 3 
August 2002.
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Herrera goes on to explain that the lack of effective 
regulations and institutions necessary for monitoring 
the market have contributed greatly to two of 
Russia’s most intractable current problems, 
widening income inequality and criminalization on a 
massive scale.44
Crime, corruption, and the mafiazation of the 
economy are now associated, and tacitly accepted, as 
part and parcel of the free market system. The per 
capita murder rate has doubled since 1990 and is the 
highest in the world, three times more than the U.S. 
and four times more than France.4S Corruption and 
extortion pervade everyday life in Russia; people 
routinely pay bribes in order to conduct their affairs, 
and government officials routinely accept and even 
demand them.46 Ordinary people are required to pay 
bribes to get a bed in a hospital, to obtain proper 
medicine or an operation, to get a passport or 
driver’s license or to register one’s place of 
residence. Recent surveys show that 75 percent of all 
Russian officials take bribes, but only 0.4 percent of 
them are punished in any way.47 In an April 2002 
report, Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov sharply 
criticized law enforcement agencies and especially 
the Interior Ministry (MVD) for ineptness in 
combating corruption. The report states that while 
the MVD knows about widespread corruption 
among state officials, including holders of the 
highest offices, most anticorruption investigations 
deal only with lower-level corruption.48 As the 
President of the INDEM Center for Applied Political 
Studies Georgy Satarov points out, “Corruption is 
not just an ethical problem or a criminal one....it is 
above all a problem of the ineffectiveness of 
government.”49 * *
On the positive side of the ledger, the wild 
capitalism of the 1990s that allowed the 
redistribution of hundreds of billions worth of 
property through controversial, and blatantly unfair, 
privatization deals, has essentially ended, and
44. Yoshiko Herrera, “Russian Economic Reform,” in Barany and 
Moser, eds., Russian Politics, pp. 141, 161, 164.
45. John O'Mahony, The Guardian (GR), 3 February 2001.
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4 June 2002.
47. Kommersant-Vlast, 30 October 2001.
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analysts have cautiously begun to say that Russia 
has moved from a developing to a developed market 
economy. The country is now poised to enter a stage 
of economic development in which respecting minor 
shareholders’ rights and maintaining transparency 
standards are deemed to be useful. This belief is 
reflected in the recent U.S. decision to certify Russia 
as a market economy, a move seen as a step forward 
in Russia's quest to join the World Trade 
Organization.50 The leaders of the G-7 countries 
decided to upgrade Russia's status to full 
membership in the group by 2006. In addition, 
Russia will host a special meeting of G-8 members 
in 2004, and the 2006 G-8 summit will be held in St. 
Petersburg.51 On the domestic front, new legal codes 
on taxation, land, and inheritance rights also have 
been signed into law. Combined with the late 2001 
reforms of the judicial system, Russia appears to be 
taking some of the constructive, pro-business steps 
that Boris Yeltsin was either unable or unwilling to 
embrace.
Of course, if there is one thing that capitalism 
has shown, it is that what is good for “business” is 
not necessarily good for the general population. 
Market democracy, in the view of many Russians, 
replaced a restrictive, egalitarian order with 
widespread poverty, rampant crime, unemployment, 
an overwhelmed health-care system, and 
environmental pollution. While this assessment 
might not be entirely accurate, perceptions are 
important since acceptance and faith in the socio­
political order are key elements in societal stability. 
Judith Shapiro’s chapter on health and healthcare 
policies in Russia argues that much of what was 
done (or not done) in the late Soviet period is 
responsible for much of the current health crisis in 
Russia.52 However, it is the period and policies of 
the Yeltsin-era shock therapists that still receive 
most of the blame for Russia’s social and economic 
woes.
The economic and social upheaval that has 
characterized the years following Communism's 
collapse in the former Soviet bloc is evident in 
nearly every aspect of life, perhaps most keenly felt 
in declining health care across the post-Soviet
50. RFE/RL Report, “Russia: Market Economy Recognized by 
US,” Moscow, 7 June 2002.
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spectrum.53 Child mortality is two to three times 
higher in Russia than in Western European 
countries, and Russian mortality figures overall are 
at the highest levels since World War II. The World 
Health Organization estimates that Russia now 
spends $251 per person per year on healthcare, 
compared with almost $1,700 per person per year in 
the European Union. Russia ranks 130th in the world 
for overall health system performance.54 It is 
estimated that 700,000 abandoned children cram the 
woefully inadequate orphanage system, more than 
the number in the entire Soviet Union after the 
Second World War.55 A truly disturbing fact is that 
most Russians living below the poverty line are 
actually employed, which is not the case in Western 
countries.56
Whether or not responsibility for the continued 
social crises plaguing Russia will be attributed to 
President Putin, who has thus far avoided blame for 
the poor state of Russian society, is another 
intriguing question. Perhaps the answer will be 
discerned through the ballot boxes when Putin 
comes up for re-election. However, as Christopher 
Marsh makes clear, “the success of democracy does 
not simply depend on whether elections are held 
according to schedule.”57 This general theme is 
explored in greater depth in the various chapters of 
the Marsh and Gvosdev volume, Civil Society and 
the Search for Justice in Russia. The authors of the 
volume examine diverse aspects and issue areas 
related to the role of civil society in contemporary 
Russia, including chapters on the experience of 
women, the marginalized voices of ethnic minorities, 
and the notion of “managed pluralism” and religion. 
After acknowledging the need of a substantial role of 
civil society for a democratic system to operate, the 
authors discuss whether Russian civil society is up to 
the tremendous task it faces. For example, one 
avenue of civil society, the NGO sector, provides 
some reason for encouragement. It has developed 
substantially over the past decade, such that in 
November 2001 the government organized a Civic 
Forum in an effort to manage the 300,000
53. Alexandra Poolos, “East: Taking The Pulse Of Post-Soviet 
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nongovernmental organizations registered with the 
Justice Ministry. Meeting for two days in the 
Kremlin State Palace in Moscow, Civic Forum 
gathered together 5,000 activists from NGOs across 
Russia. President Putin addressed the gathering on 
its first day, assuring delegates that civil society 
could not be formed at the initiative of the 
government. To some, government attempts to co­
opt civil society give rise to the fear that the 
government aimed to create surrogate, parallel 
structures of its own to compete with any 
independent social organizations.58
How much of Russia’s democratization efforts 
are legitimate, and how much of it is simply 
window-dressing, is an incredibly important avenue 
of inquiry, as Russia’s path to democratization (or 
even the desire to proceed in that direction) is not yet 
assured. Zvi Gitelman’s concluding chapter for 
Developments in Russian Politics strikes a cautious 
(and I believe astute) note by suggesting that there is 
no reason to assume either the inevitability or 
impossibility of a democratic Russia. He posits that 
Russian democratization efforts have been halted at 
the creation stage, a development (or rather, lack of 
development) that he attributes in great part “to the 
contradictory nature of Yeltsin’s impulses,” as well 
as to the fact that neither Yeltsin nor Putin “has even 
tried to form an institutionalized constituency for 
democracy.59
So, where does this leave us, or rather, where 
does this leave Russia? In part, we can agree with 
Gordon Smith, that “the transition from communism 
experienced in Russia, rather than expanding the 
state’s capacity to make and implement policy, has 
resulted in the creation of political vacuums, 
institutional malaise, chaos, and lawlessness.”60 A 
harsh assessment, but not far off the mark, 
particularly if one uses Western democracies as the 
benchmark. But while utilizing external models and 
conceptions might best capture Russia’s movement 
toward becoming a “Western power,” it might not be 
the best method of gauging the political, economic 
and social aspirations of the citizens of the Russian 
Federation. In fact, most Russians (oligarchic elite 
and new Russians excluded) reject the imperialistic
arrogance' of “democratic values,” the anti­
intellectual proclivities of Western mass culture 
(such as is reflected in mainstream television and 
films), and the soulless worship of acquisition that 
seems to drive the Western societies.
Consequently, conceptions of what a modem 
democratic order should look like, especially in 
terms of social justice and true freedom (which 
includes economic rights as well as voting rights), 
must be worked out within and among the peoples of 
the Russian Federation, not imported from (or 
foisted upon them) militarily superior allies, 
regardless of how well-meaning or self-assured 
those new friends might be. Slavic communalism, 
Soviet egalitarianism, not to mention many centuries 
of Russian culture and values, will likely form the 
basis of Russian society in the new millenium. This 
is as it should be. The authors reviewed here have 
employed a wide array of methods, concepts, 
theories and approaches to analyze the myriad 
aspects of contemporary society, providing great 
insight into the democratic development of the 
West’s newfound partner and erstwhile ally. They 
tell us a great deal about where Russia is, and how 
things reached the point that they have. But as 
Christopher Marsh points out in Russia at the Polls, 
“more than a decade of democratic reforms has 
made abundantly clear, Russia’s history is far from 
over.”61
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